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ABSTRACT
Leaked secrets, such as passwords and API keys, in codebases were
responsible for numerous security breaches. Existing heuristic
techniques, such as paern matching, entropy analysis, and ma-
chine learning, exist to detect and alert developers of such leaks.
Heuristics, however, naturally exhibit false positives, which require
triaging and can lead to developer frustration. We propose to use
known production secrets as a source of ground truth for sning
secret leaks in codebases. We develop techniques for using known
secrets to sni whole codebases and continuously sni dierential
code revisions. We uncover dierent performance and security
needs when sning for known secrets in these two situations in
an industrial environment.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Code repositories may accidentally leak secrets, such as private
keys, API tokens, or passwords. Such leaks facilitated numerous
past security exploits [4, 7, 13]. Existing tools for detecting leaked
secrets oen use heuristic techniques such as regex paerns [1, 2, 8–
10, 12], entropy analysis [1, 3, 8, 12], and machine learning [5, 6].
Heuristic techniques, however, can be prone to false positives, thus
requiring manual triaging of analysis output. Moreover, a block-
ing mechanism to prevent developers from ever uploading secrets
into codebases requires a very low false-positive rate; otherwise,
developers will become frustrated and lose condence [11].
We propose a method for detecting secret leaks in codebases that
aims to minimize false positives. We use known production secrets
as a source of ground truth for detecting the presence of secrets. We
extract known production secrets from our secret managers—tools
that centrally manage storage of and access to secrets. Although
sning for known secrets cannot detect leaks of secrets not stored
in a secret manager, we expect very few false positives with our
technique of sning with known secrets.
We apply our method of sning for known secrets to (1) sni
whole codebases and (2) continuously sni dierential code revi-
sions. We discovered dierent performance and security require-
ments when using known secrets to sni for leaks in these scenarios,
which lead to dierent approaches to sni for known secrets in
these two scenarios.
2 APPROACH
We develop a continuous dierential code revision snier to rapidly
detect and respond to secret leaks. We complement our continu-
ous snier with a whole codebase snier to detect secrets leaked
prior to adopting the continuous snier. We additionally intend to
periodically run the whole codebase snier to detect leaks missed
by the continuous snier, since a developer may leak a secret into
our codebase before adding the now-leaked secret into a secret
manager.
2.1 Whole Codebase Snier
We sni for secret leaks in whole codebases by paern matching
against raw production secrets. e Whole Codebase Snier pulls
production secrets from secret managers, constructs regex paerns
for each secret, and aempts to nd matches for these instructions
in our codebase.
When constructing a regex paern for a secret, we consider
the possibility that a hard-coded secret might be interrupted by
whitespace or string concatenations. We thusmatch anywhitespace
and up to 5 non-whitespace characters between each character in
the secret.
Since our codebase is gigabytes in size, our Whole Codebase
Snier needs to be reasonably performant on such large inputs.
2.2 Continuous Dierential Revision Snier
Unlike the scenario of sning whole codebases, sning dieren-
tial code revisions—such as git commits—does not require siing
through gigabytes of source code. However, our Continuous Dif-
ferential Revision Snier needs to cope with a high velocity of
uploaded code revisions during times of busy development.
We found the Whole Codebase Snier’s step of pulling all pro-
duction secrets from our secret managers per every invocation to
be excessively slow for continuous sning. An alternative is to
maintain a cache of raw production secrets for our continuous snif-
fer. Caching our production secrets, however, increases our aack
surface and requires strict access control to the system hosting the
continuous snier.
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Figure 1: Continuous Dierential Revision Snier
To satisfy the performance needs of continuously sning a high
velocity of code revisions while managing risks to the conden-
tiality of our production secrets, we use a hashing-based approach
to detect leaks of known secrets. Figure 1 visualizes the process
of sning for leaked secrets in a dierential code revision. e
continuous snier maintains a cache of hashed secrets derived from
the raw secrets in our secret managers. When a developer uploads
a dierential code revision for code review, the continuous snier
tokenizes the dierential code revision. e snier then hashes the
revision’s tokens and compares the set of hashed tokens to the set
of hashed production secrets. If the intersection of the two sets is
nonzero, then the code revision leaks secrets.
If the Continuous Dierential Revision Snier detects the leak
of known secrets in a developer’s code revision, the most secure
next step is to block the developer from pushing the leaky code
revision onto the remote codebase. A developer-blocking solution,
however, brings stricter requirements for reliability and security
of the sning tool and its supporting infrastructure. Failures in
a developer-blocking secret snier, whether due to logic bugs or
infrastructure failure, can—in the worst case—hinder every sin-
gle soware developer in the company from pushing code. Such
failures can induce developers to lose trust and condence in the
company’s security team. Such distrust can lead to an unwillingness
to adopt developer-facing security tools in the future. Moreover, a
developer-blocking snier would open a potential aack vector to
brute force production secrets. Remedies to close this aack vector,
such as rate limiting, are also subject to the same stringent relia-
bility requirements of a developer-blocking snier. As an interim
solution, the snier alerts security incident responders, rather than
block the developer, in the event of a detected secret leak.
3 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We propose using known production secrets as a source of ground
truth for sning secret leaks with few false positives. We intend
to use known secrets to sni both whole codebases and contin-
uously sni dierential code revisions in our industrial soware
engineering environment.
We intend to evaluate our sniers on our internal codebases,
and compare their performance to existing heuristics-based secret
detection tools.
We observe that a substantial portion of our secrets reside in
structured formats (e.g.: JSON, XML) alongside non-secret informa-
tion. An example is a JSON credentials le containing a non-secret
username and a secret password. We may develop techniques to
decompose such structured secrets in future work.
Since secret leaks are not exclusive to codebases, we are also
considering extending our sniers to inspect emails, chat systems,
and databases.
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